Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d025b24f7179db8d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

108.5 KB Created: 2020-05-06 02:52:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 78224bebdf8d79c078a95c9a7912d60b SHA-1: cb85e2f61770b5416d58c08241c49c38f0b9ea54 SHA-256: d025b24f7179db8dcc6dda416f90220e9559dde564a5b24c0dc7a02fc823c97c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of CreateObject calls and the extracted artifact 'macros.bas' suggest that the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The confidence is high due to the clear indicators of macro execution, but the exact nature of the payload cannot be determined without further analysis.

Heuristics 5

  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
41e34c508df4511c605d4a69368d5b6139beb47a794b96e2c2c1556ce022c9af
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9303 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
1695d9d725d0fce3324bd88d60f3ee9f2cf10123b09f1d209cf3636c761ba4c2
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 21504 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.