Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d01453e2fcb46101…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 1e082776a170e7093fb3b58cdbdde0c2 SHA-1: 4743c28dc8ace87e67ecb5785259a0ac047bc5d6 SHA-256: d01453e2fcb46101dc0c5215cf35e3866d68fd3bd2497ee74735c843135407ad
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model and Distributed Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor. The presence of \objupdate and \objdata sections indicates an attempt to automatically activate and execute embedded content, likely exploiting a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b9.bin
23f65b1c1ed6ef533e74dee2cab367ffd753187cd25b53a299b711966f9f0e46
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB9 1895 bytes