Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cfda15334d9c6147…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.8 KB Created: 2021-01-18 04:23:28 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: eba163f134e1ddd4d9addca6447fcc0d SHA-1: d1fb1742466ad5dcba46969e68c2a56ef8bfc498 SHA-256: cfda15334d9c61476ffd7cf23e892d1d53dcd20e2ce63f13c8a745ce32487e6a
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, identified as a link farm, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of numerous external URLs and the nature of the heuristics point towards a malicious document designed to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/123?utm_term=williams+grove+speedway+mechanicsburg+pa PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383802/normal_5f8d307b87800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nonudefetug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314303/6827714.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://welavofewefose.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813025/pejulesojaweti-rikipopunaxob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nenugatigubom.66ghz.com/57977927770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zirawasapawati.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134878995/208281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://minizaderi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134344024/5068219.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://palozemoxapido.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134366311/noluleliv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wirufaxiferid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134599318/c67d87d3c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xekixudag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134336078/8984299.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/podadoxafa/jfrlijd/50489672995.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xeliwiwogivo/YjcD59Q/twitter_down_downdetector.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bazifimu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661545/cfb116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/guwuweri/WgfjqH9/my_movies_for_macbook.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/giwumazusew/iajiLmj/42149487294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xusawoji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739635/6f2e16d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saxipapes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738636/e0f4222e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://finesegugumemo.epizy.com/79473650096.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eb0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB0A 5896 bytes
SHA-256: 741bdddf133086f6cae6c8fe4388b28e013fe309180cac0c74309a6b21496fb5
font_01_sfnt_off0000ff0f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF0F 13712 bytes
SHA-256: 8ef6ac24ab654daa1d00a6dc15d5c42934fec0171b023ae68c55fe99113f5a23