Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cfbf618fdc617b81…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.7 KB Created: 2021-04-24 17:17:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: dcacadcc60141229cc81249066b7281e SHA-1: 7df890b2fd19f37fe906bf772d55d6ea6b5f2143 SHA-256: cfbf618fdc617b8192d89ee2c3e233c040b17864fbe32324617d808243c809df
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains, which is characteristic of a link farm used to distribute phishing content or malware. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or trojan delivery. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, a tool sometimes abused for malicious PDF creation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9967

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xezojetit.ru/strik?utm_term=can+illegitimate+child+inherit+in+india
    • http://topcreditscore.info/livro_adsorop8rue.pdf
    • http://axecheat7.xyz/verizon_messages_app_not_working_2020tk4aj.pdf
    • http://canonsburglake.com/14624802804z45yp.pdf
    • http://xijonofupawulo.mypressonline.com/99285132637.pdf
    • http://bred-enligne.com/sejowugmlm1.pdf
    • http://gidilakapajuke.mywebcommunity.org/calendrio_2020_brasil.pdf
    • https://dekaraguw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134511216/6208635.pdf
    • http://pokezokebawi.mygamesonline.org/wibilumemu.pdf
    • http://timelessdecorum.com/88786474758jljh7.pdf
    • https://bulasekujamur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134377464/ziberupa_fomivu.pdf
    • https://ruxevikupasej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134663562/3272603.pdf
    • https://toxilitabosi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134495834/8c3563cb0.pdf
    • https://manabaxijex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134626004/telaborepo.pdf
    • https://zugufirit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163535/051643f4c8.pdf
    • https://pebarefilegiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135325086/dixoxalu_zikuwolax_tetalixowuwofu_togakafesupo.pdf
    • http://vofigasu.medianewsonline.com/fisicoquimica_gilbert_castellan.pdf
    • http://pelistens.xyz/kugakuk6lw0q.pdf
    • http://djami.ru/how_do_you_light_a_magic_chef_rv_ovennf6kr.pdf
    • https://sopoxovolofu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134509961/juranimit_validaniluguza.pdf
    • https://sagakoto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814189/8579667.pdf
    • https://mezepobavufu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134717124/vadoluwasevuk-tinulujogi-sigujapaxejuwe.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/25da8ef1-ebbc-4cf6-a2c8-05dfa80b606f/zapudop.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0466556d-ea08-459c-937e-8f22b5d5aa77/25934056749.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9f875173-4b4d-4580-a576-97217a6b4047/tatetizimaribususit.pdf
    • http://begujewirefe.myartsonline.com/2133852210.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3ee7e27d-8367-46a2-9668-b0bdb2b6e395/88836750191.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011ad3.bin
661c8a3474d2fb356f178a5c850b196ef3e70705fe8e146a585465a473dddfa1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11AD3 5080 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012be3.bin
479329d19ed349c8701da1ddaa24769b3742aab8db86f1dad958fb049e67d782
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12BE3 11172 bytes