Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cfab654824adb31b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: d6c9d05d41839bff738e5b79f5b4c325 SHA-1: 324e51ec2da98022941d69f51a23de2e070ebfae SHA-256: cfab654824adb31b7bac0f574011cf898eef0dd3eb794ad63104e7e7b71781bf
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains an embedded XFA form that triggers a critical vulnerability, CVE-2010-0188, which is known to be used for exploiting Adobe Reader. The exploit is delivered via an inline XFA image/tif payload. No JavaScript or document body content was available for further analysis, but the presence of this specific exploit strongly suggests a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
6cd889ba7546d0da7a0459685d4ec507981b601aae249d9a2cc350b7c543605e
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes