PDF malware analysis — malicious · cfa65840aef3f5e6

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.1 KB

MD5: 93b6e77978c6012328a79dd0c2816e1a SHA-1: e19a84d927d95c87b561dcee8bf40186ade914ec SHA-256: cfa65840aef3f5e6f4ed15d52550345f7c19c2707e0ec4c36fa2ed03b7b36742

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 JavaScript/JScript T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS. A critical heuristic, CVE_2007_5659, specifically identifies the use of the Collab.collectEmailInfo method to stage and execute hex-decoded JavaScript. This technique is commonly used to download and execute further malicious payloads. The ClamAV detection of Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `3e297d2e0153d431133bd15bab583b9ab478338b1ffdf83cce547556a2058cee`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5178 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `689342a988bd4825954f6062fb567d19ed9044c9e47d56c5ab928c27cc7d3a16`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	82501 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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