Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cfa4326e9d634e3d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.7 KB Created: 2021-06-27 19:43:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 67b722261219f2427b593f88e4d6030e SHA-1: d56efdaa8b34f6dec820a486a474487ebecf221c SHA-256: cfa4326e9d634e3d4ec90504ab227d7547983cc91b2706054c2f103860ee659c
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file exhibits characteristics of a credential phishing campaign, specifically impersonating Facebook with a lure related to 'free Robux'. The presence of multiple links to compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or redirect users to phishing pages. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely involving the exploitation of PDF vulnerabilities to execute further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9972

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+you+get+free+robux+2021.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://antoinepanau.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/62b90ef5f8aa66187e4c8e0e126f4f02/68663872586.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.fecomerciomg.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bb6018e3a52---36768946258.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sazjah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093a2728f381---popexusiwejixoposamilulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mkting.com.co/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d4015318eb9411906d2e1cea753d0073/53226412126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://advancedbusiness.co/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6908f41cc30aebbd0f021439de36f528/62547547144.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://czdashan.cn/uploadfile/file/2021062114230173499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aymsoft.us/aym_image/files/8675002912.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kalirich.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1k930bh9sa93mf5fb2qevu1pm1/93202534852.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aldea.work/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/feae47627ecea85ad6a720060d83b4a5/79775444170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pharma-tools.eu/galeria/file/kijowal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://solmoda.it/userfiles/files/62702477473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andreevmag.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/18c5de882dffac70e51b5f33e7fbe8de/piroluxorige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://socialacademy.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b938133bba04e2c77fc2678d38a86c39/bubifirukeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mosoptagro.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/993abcc60a2f48e890d27eed289ecdc6/20562799324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://btegypt.com/file/37292180557.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dhf-china.com/d/files/94105139524.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80akij1ajew.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d3c9fcebbff---lipagaxufugusebidagaruk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vildmarksjagt.dk/userfiles/file/90033644162.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ylpcl.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/27920118336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nuregio.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c95f79e834f---152558244.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c9bdbd2def---89667791596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+you+get+free+robux+2021PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e6c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6C3 17408 bytes
SHA-256: 04ce79eb9ecf9bec9345adb7367bb736f44974a4b2b7d4930c2c4b756c5a3f80
font_01_sfnt_off0001146a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1146A 10784 bytes
SHA-256: b99ea59a955067632d70bffa7027de6e7c864b6ee3cb6801a52d771b3c5d01ff
font_02_sfnt_off00012d4d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12D4D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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