Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf93792186933b28…

MALICIOUS

RTF

871.2 KB First seen: 2019-01-12
MD5: cc1ddcbd5c08ef1ef84fb3da9f90a65b SHA-1: 2d4f6b9dad59d9a74bc6f6f2c292e6d7f8b53d4c SHA-256: cf93792186933b288521ce68cc30a3b1fe3fe8f2cd3ab85de75e59cbedecee02
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE objects and triggers the CVE-2017-8570 vulnerability, which is known to drop and execute script files. The embedded URL 'http://test1.ru/newbuild/t.php?act=hit' is likely used to download a secondary payload. The exploitation of this vulnerability suggests an attempt to gain initial access via a malicious attachment.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 7 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.thawte.com0 In RTF body
    • http://ts-ocsp.ws.symantec.com07In RTF body
    • http://test1.ru/newbuild/t.php?act=hitIn RTF body
    • http://crl.thawte.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In RTF body
    • http://ts-aia.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.cer0In RTF body
    • http://ts-crl.ws.symantec.com/tss-ca-g2.crl0(In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml}}\paperw11906\paperh16838\margl1701\margr850\margt1134\margb1134\gutter0\ltrsectIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000025.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x25 205 bytes
SHA-256: 75a725fc96463ea024899f12597b26031b1a5d84ddd2de407d47914073b3db59
objdata_01_off000001ea.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EA 354283 bytes
SHA-256: 42845cf81e8f7d17b9d8fc2a8da8cb3f012483bbf1cba9fb352d42cccd2a5ed4
objdata_02_off000c5820.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC5820 1068 bytes
SHA-256: 2b28d78ceb2a564ae30f2b6865926b068f3f920a373c2e3fc4cb865091eddd89
objdata_03_off000c60ab.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC60AB 36440 bytes
SHA-256: 11290e69c3c7b88f22214230479dc467fca6f42052bbffde39374a45d783de7d
objdata_04_off000d7d8d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7D8D 369 bytes
SHA-256: 3c0b4878e98d51d984a06b9ba36e54869ecd67e41f335730fced4ca28976d877
objdata_05_off000d80a3.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD80A3 890 bytes
SHA-256: 21dcdf875b1972c61c0e8c2c2123f9a95c8f29fb4a2cf8bf52511b328881de8e
objdata_06_off000d87fe.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD87FE 2633 bytes
SHA-256: 27c6d10cfe7974ebf40c1200cc005f9878cc37b7d49ece9cbc396d700c38918a

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.