Formbook — Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf84c3fe2adb8295…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

185.9 KB First seen: 2022-03-21
MD5: dab171e36703ea3cf78c9487717519ab SHA-1: 13a7fcc2652ec92fcfe0d35287a0df541a1d732f SHA-256: cf84c3fe2adb829528c0295e176d91f1fa73fa007d969ca4813f6410daee6ca5
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Formbook · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

This password-encrypted OOXML document contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, identified as a carrier for exploit code. The presence of anomalous Equation Editor native stream data and ClamAV's detection of 'Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0' strongly indicates it is a Formbook downloader. The exploit targets CVE-2018-0798, leveraging the Equation Editor vulnerability to deliver the payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.

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