Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf7ec2dbdf31c883…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.1 KB Created: 2020-10-07 00:53:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: fb1286387d96d9d6bbc70655fc820c0e SHA-1: fb82b9d8db316a9959f407ea05c971a6428c270d SHA-256: cf7ec2dbdf31c883f9002942f8cec0a8975823703a5a27f575c53f257258edfe
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=explorateur+de+fichier+freebox+mini In PDF document text
    • http://files.blacklght.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482988/4730613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ayatechnologies.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776406/cd7a1a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lwkdesigns.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482975/810cd160d22b8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gonasas.efy-online.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740405/tefozovuzop_kafadagamike.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039815.mozfiles.com/files/1039815/62556504627.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036791.mozfiles.com/files/1036791/fuzaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040609.mozfiles.com/files/1040609/32864879916.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7f70342b-db42-46e9-acb3-5bff2d73db9c/69618735943.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2cceb738-8bdf-4fef-aff1-15c8a693527e/12656713944.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7a475cfa-8a12-4750-aa8e-d38ccbd30439/7567233732.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7b43c137-5130-492c-be96-2934ef906e8d/mebilenonojufotowizopa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ad177dfb-04f9-4bce-aa7d-357e5397ce71/lidelanugetodunafonukul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/1995/8944/files/elements_of_a_business_letter.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0646/5947/files/51622664375.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/2053/6989/files/nezajomoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005a61.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5A61 5380 bytes
SHA-256: 747e06bbbf6fd0132f609723e507d6d457323f13cb6299812ad9c37c491100a0
font_01_sfnt_off00006c86.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C86 10372 bytes
SHA-256: fe275f273252fd9686803a080d7f787db14d151a7b961f8658fed9df11455c14

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.