Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf6623ac5aa7f325…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

21.4 KB Created: 2017-12-14 13:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-04-26
MD5: 94b84c0dd74d23e4b7c8bc7697a0c50d SHA-1: 0175820c7ac0151b6a6d4187b3f26ae5e9c1d34a SHA-256: cf6623ac5aa7f325e6a52a6227ac0b73b05c10fcf801b75665873aca7299d915
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages CVE-2017-0199 to load external content. The heuristic firings indicate the exploitation of a remote loader vulnerability, specifically targeting the URL https://pages.github.com@bot.ax/QUrBw. This suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the specified URL, characteristic of a downloader or initial access stage.

Heuristics 3

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pages.github.com@bot.ax/QUrBw
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
c3d4c5dfe019e61c614b81733887bf8fd99cb8f2410d9a04904661c77c0a64e7
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 49184 bytes