Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf3a40b9b914ab4d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

56.4 KB Created: 2020-11-07 02:17:33 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 12246c45550500558b05d5c8e9814a5a SHA-1: 20045606ab8415119dbf10dc73d3cef495e6ce3f SHA-256: cf3a40b9b914ab4de583ffc2639e730b35a5b0e8f04319fc22a969c41b7b9cf1
272 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure critical SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: action link to abused redirector https://pexulowiseguwuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134391342/99e6c1.pdf.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/aws?keyword=chase+bank+subpoena+service In PDF document text
    • https://pexulowiseguwuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134391342/99e6c1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418584/normal_5fa2dce83e1a8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wilunozuwi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134432110/1e7428cd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pozanabuloga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134366917/677ab96575da47e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kulojimafad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134518235/jukifegedane.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sanaxuruvumuvuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438582/ponepubawijis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415974/normal_5f970c3dab7c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368759/normal_5fa1f40deb395.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wusoxebuwewete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134432123/88b3cb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426556/normal_5fa2eb0082bbc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekubuzebebam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739705/cae83016b58fe7b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kogemamol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134487898/zupojesuwenud_wipobaxari_sarexam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382201/normal_5f9f595647cc0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zomuzigo/difikas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/glossaire_de_l_assurance.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009c7e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9C7E 5160 bytes
SHA-256: d655f26643a63fdcdd279bfa678daf4313183f9e2a2c1def46378905a1d1ceaf
font_01_sfnt_off0000ae02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAE02 11312 bytes
SHA-256: 57925224400720513292af595bdbe3a3ae07be6d28ad5fc7e5d67419e88eefc1