RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · cf2b6f3184ef87cb

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: e4bb69b5261390d19f68f33fda55dc6f SHA-1: 623f536ebef563767b268f7aa61348048e7ae84e SHA-256: cf2b6f3184ef87cbe902b2263961405109650121bb047aa903569c353efe9029

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that uses OLE object embedding and auto-linking, combined with a lure to 'Enable Editing'. This strongly suggests an attempt to bypass security controls and execute embedded malicious content. The document body's text, while garbled, reinforces the lure by claiming Office does not work in email preview and instructing the user to download and enable editing. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object activation points to a downloader or exploit execution.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `f9d5da87cc229d21ec6954d9f7afbf572c282c4e3716767b4f3dc148ad8ab9cd`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79784 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `f8fb033968bc59855367d4f907e340b6e6cc5a624a41455d208a487e2a297a3e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79757 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E	12297 bytes

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