Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf23c49aed73711e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

58.4 KB Created: 2020-04-03 14:42:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 12b6bfa5921e6c335a0ab95b3caf66a9 SHA-1: b24c52caab342aabb0f56e0ab9d2e22006d41bee SHA-256: cf23c49aed73711ed0ddd4e34ab4eadbc4c1f6e9ddac09ead2563ec01d90892f
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to other PDF files hosted on various domains. The document body, though partially corrupted, references 'Dominos case study 2013' and includes the wkhtmltopdf generator, suggesting a deceptive lure. The primary intent appears to be SEO spam or directing users to potentially malicious content hosted across these numerous domains.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ndalaroyalholdings.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130542953/130542953.html#dominos+case+study+2013
    • http://imdcorp.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604025/f21aa37ab.pdf
    • http://mindstrikecreative.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740166/3293353.pdf
    • http://ssilvaadvogados.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483108/6983609.pdf
    • http://our-little-home.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070506/188302.pdf
    • http://velocityofbusiness.ca/uploads/1/3/0/5/130543878/samiluni-rizatuxoji-wimazuwapodi-babiniberurape.pdf
    • http://trishweberstudio.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130640128/408565.pdf
    • http://dyannafearon.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130541208/xarelatitomuvuvan.pdf
    • http://liebertinsurance.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130542875/a9a28d714a5d2.pdf
    • http://cherokeemarshphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130603819/nezegapezupep_metitopekop.pdf
    • http://susancontini.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069978/gikuzika_doxesafetupu_debigopun_joguwad.pdf
    • http://copech.org/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588442/mibomuxurapive-balibamali-jadutolopoz-difulazokazupu.pdf
    • http://singaporepropertynewlaunches.info/uploads/1/3/0/5/130543020/d31303f27a70e1.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000a2fd.bin
85ed39c202325e8c0d35c133e424797b958315e62cf7b4e107bbe8982c11c846
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA2FD 9060 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000c562.bin
4c8702bf2685272063a126a2ed0cce728640a3d7461b6ba13d31dc0864862f94
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC562 16084 bytes