Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf213465807430c9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

69.3 KB
MD5: 70a04a64d14f8f08466323ff892540b8 SHA-1: a764eb90cf10aaa872771474d2dc564d9ce9fa21 SHA-256: cf213465807430c9b1501acea9369f943eeefce36ba3b16a1c8d5ffe5ccbf0b9
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, but the heuristics strongly indicate a classic Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000019e8.bin
e61ec827ab1dc237bc6ac59c37e21eb2f0d4717be4895acb5f63ff045c500c94
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19E8 1646 bytes