Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ceff988490d98c14…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

83.5 KB Created: 2021-08-30 05:06:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 81830b6007b3fc185283ad06a88e91b1 SHA-1: b7d28ee5681f042f4b71d065ecf89867bee34e69 SHA-256: ceff988490d98c142e4430d0bd52e3bdaa5858f5d7bb4cea095b0e9966a570c2
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'document_open' macro is configured to execute. It writes content to a file named '1.hta' and then executes it using 'explorer.exe'. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality, aiming to execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' confirms the document's intent to trick users into enabling macros.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueOffice08210-9889818-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueOffice08210-9889818-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d9ab3be354a8290dc63d7da5621c161f26319ed4c688a2e88f9f6ac5d725cce1
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 682 bytes