RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · ced3bce163d3fec6

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

341.7 KB

MD5: f438216787fdc704de524cc6cf93e0c3 SHA-1: f96a0c340293dbd68e13a67ddd0cb2c12e0ac478 SHA-256: ced3bce163d3fec66ce7539a8e4da73fd6c5b2975cec17bd2af6ca027c36a81f

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Exploitation for Client Execution: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to be activated by the user. The presence of the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document likely contains instructions to enable macros or content, a common technique for malware droppers. The embedded OLE objects are the primary mechanism for delivering the malicious payload, though the specific nature of the payload cannot be determined from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin` `b77c2de8bde6314603900354f4f05cf03ee6a549ce8a693a7641aedc34831b26`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0	75704 bytes
`objdata_01_off00027369.bin` `f4c761490fd63fc4aa791746a9a2b588dafd9e2c764f57f0c85377b99ef07062`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x27369	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002890c.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2890C	12297 bytes

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