Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cec2378f41be4a9a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

13.5 KB First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: e170ee7c36f38a504fabb19d2c9bc04f SHA-1: 6872a6dd8783e0e02ae6660aee827e2a3a9ae12e SHA-256: cec2378f41be4a9a4aa4fa557dd1391222da9acdfc4a39701647d4a460cb12b8
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a CLSID indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces activation of this object, which is known to lead to arbitrary code execution. The decoded OLE object, named 'objdata_00_off00001956.bin', likely contains the exploit and subsequent payload. This pattern is commonly used in targeted phishing attacks.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001956.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1956 3644 bytes
SHA-256: 9558050883c28435107c15a7d5a4f37e204fbf4382d2dd8a4f22dc7dc9771f63

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