Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ceb93ee3093dbf1a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

526.5 KB Created: 2024-05-27 06:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: c60b41f0981f617fa83a73704a10e147 SHA-1: 9280a177cbd7b05a33050eab66c6ecdc38d9bcb1 SHA-256: ceb93ee3093dbf1a49918ede81055018d9c0f0945a97f904a16951010cfbce61
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages CVE-2017-8759 and CVE-2023-36884 to load an external RTF object from the URL https://www-army-mil-bd.dirctt88.co/65048925/doc.rtf. This indicates a likely attempt to download and execute a secondary payload. The document body itself contains minimal readable content, so the primary indicators are the heuristic firings related to external object loading.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884
    Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (https://www-army-mil-bd.dirctt88.co/65048925/doc.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex

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