Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ce9f8f34fe76be87…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

323.3 KB Created: 2021-05-08 02:35:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 1ddaa7947f39eb9d27bf4996b80bd586 SHA-1: e35e6da0d507cbc3e2a4ca90f123ca84d5260922 SHA-256: ce9f8f34fe76be875d29460fad6dc202f1199214b4fb992409dfc96e9c135892
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is a risky file type, specifically a JAR archive, which suggests it is intended to deliver a secondary payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC. Further analysis of the OLE object's contents would be required to determine the exact nature of the payload and establish a more specific family attribution.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
07fc828fea8dc61b81fa760e22b8e08708bba25cecf3de7eff5aece749c50011		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 328192 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
196470c193ff57152b339e32a096059007c9f0f0d3dd82a6eb31d80190630b88		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 323151 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
af7759a3fa4f8d56f49dee0ca9f8de3e4ca1d45878d07530446f48aea26dace6		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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