Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ce9cc75fdc6a4410…

MALICIOUS

RTF

13.1 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: bd1355eea20bf7867b7f39ebaa4fd38f SHA-1: a8be5115ae57204267fa569e6a31d4a209643992 SHA-256: ce9cc75fdc6a441078a43b0ee354e0f3752863834ed25aa8a11152d9b04a8888
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly suggests exploitation of this vulnerability for arbitrary code execution. This is typically used to download and execute a second-stage payload, hence the likely attack pattern. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000168b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x168B 2881 bytes
SHA-256: c2cfa47cf5c1387ebc94b7f9ff517e6b7a9a0f71482480061fb785e1521b0d7c