RTF malware analysis — malicious · ce860a9ed10d93ac

MALICIOUS

RTF

97.3 KB First seen: 2024-10-12

MD5: 3a621c6afb9d50d0f4e10896b31626cc SHA-1: 1b651c7451642ab266e8b8f9a8ca129616f6fd41 SHA-256: ce860a9ed10d93acfff92d6fed47edba9ac0edc7183c942b64946c0931c119fd

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. This is a common technique for exploiting Equation Editor vulnerabilities to achieve remote code execution.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000010f2.bin` `6661b251b084ad4373da3fbfd2b71832e631a626576e1a54745e7761f97a2f8f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x10F2	2133 bytes

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