Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ce54e81125eb44ed…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

241.5 KB
MD5: 7098066eab8807aa361fa1f0fdff57ca SHA-1: d6534ac36458aafd6b4b52e6716903786fb6241a SHA-256: ce54e81125eb44ed53dec51f69f439d692ec3fcbfa99be82886163b5c869e74b
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with one specifically configured to auto-update and activate. This technique is commonly used to bypass Office macro security settings and execute malicious code. The presence of OLE object data and auto-linking heuristics strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit these features for payload delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
abd8d3c9154910855cbc7c7569d060958beccd42d67fc465c7cc81dac830cb79
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 26642 bytes
objdata_01_off0000e280.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE280 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000f823.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF823 12297 bytes