Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ce4c34f0863952bc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

86.6 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 481a77b54aadc043ef971f1c67a12cb9 SHA-1: b750e9b41c3cf99f28230bf39c767681ac12a9b8 SHA-256: ce4c34f0863952bcddbd869751620fe88f9181386435e30f650535958a35cb21
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2009-3129, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Excel's FEATHEADER record. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of suspicious cmd.exe invocation and PEB access heuristics further supports the malicious nature of the file. While no scripts were extracted, the exploit itself is the primary attack vector, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2009-3129 — Excel FEATHEADER record overflow critical CVE exact CVE_2009_3129
    Workbook BIFF stream contains a FEATHEADER (Feature Header) record with anomalous size (record_size=22, isf=4, cbHdrData=4). Legitimate FEATHEADER records are tiny (<100 bytes) and carry cbHdrData values that fit in the record body; the value here is the documented CVE-2009-3129 exploit primitive — cbHdrData drives a memcpy with attacker-controlled size, leading to memory corruption and code execution in Excel 2007/2003.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 88,638 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 64,073 bytes (72%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.pdf-repair.com
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/Producer(Advanced
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/ModDate(D:20100406171120+08
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

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