Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdf4664c93b698fd…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.2 KB First seen: 2023-03-22
MD5: 8be240ea9814810a1c8a8754595b28b5 SHA-1: 4d8132422f25ce550f38901ebc462df5aa2a2268 SHA-256: cdf4664c93b698fdc7ccff8589a27bbd4b1ab01b33c44fa6a1ad63747be7e108
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is set to activate automatically upon opening the document. This exploit is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, hence the high confidence in this attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000672.bin
55db414ae0646e9d4b8768c851f5044d12d5a2a0c910ac19441b4515f082bae5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x672 1664 bytes