Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdd4808ee76b2b39…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.1 KB Created: 2020-11-06 20:09:59 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: 725a305af754b892a715606131d3c7a7 SHA-1: 0e340cf49732c6e0e534041372f60ba82d797930 SHA-256: cdd4808ee76b2b39ecff102446c05cfe77a1b6b2c6fb84471bfa250c341009cc
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=the+crossing+movie+2018 In PDF document text
    • https://rapokivagifo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134338569/sajax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetifojijebene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134474841/d89d6be.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fukoxifixe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460993/6717e4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://worikakejimo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134466185/244f9d76be.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://jurimewuva.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/91777551244.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vasukobemuzo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/68225519059.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lagonepij.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/54369881304.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutekosakiwe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/arduino_nano_v3_schematic.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vadazigifexe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/merozasopegujibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zugibiraw.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/manual_programacion_android_espaol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dowuwiridewe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/timixuwifawuwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://virinumit.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/xomubotodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dadasumuw.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/febeleromosofovemuwam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000091e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x91E8 6560 bytes
SHA-256: b60e6c1ddbf9c3b24adb7c3c70ff226735ea93c83baaaae8c59ba0e321578e2a
font_01_sfnt_off0000a83e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA83E 5208 bytes
SHA-256: 52df504fe48ae001b81de6e0d85a8b02b7eefd882c77f91781dff7b60503257f
font_02_sfnt_off0000b9c2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB9C2 11096 bytes
SHA-256: dd9af3215722d7a75f7541f3d9467a4b417602afcd73b02de64c8e6ad7f18190
font_03_sfnt_off0000df7d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF7D 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71