Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cdb0f89e6713164b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.28 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-18
MD5: 28327079d9712ffdc76debfcc2492f07 SHA-1: 1bfe1b20c85ee1891aa1e34b8c0ef6eac890eab5 SHA-256: cdb0f89e6713164be31b283007536e83a25c89b76b4b6f0100e4d176f83c3fc7
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The critical heuristic firing indicates the presence of a payload exploiting CVE-2017-11882 within an Equation Editor OLE object. This exploit is commonly used to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is sufficient evidence of malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin
0e74f03b42dbfb73650ae77db35efc03f254670fe5c220fbf54bacb45cb41486
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0146995D/Ole10Native 50530 bytes
ole10native_01.bin
18d367fb2691c250888963414e1f0f0f34a85093ea78ded4022d3b67fd43d3d2
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01469960/Ole10Native 61938 bytes
ole10native_05.bin
5ca53f7e54aeae620f8fa76e021b0557233ebfeb7c05d9eb292b087abcd56067
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01469967/ole10NaTiVe 1900 bytes