Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cd9801e90cb00db8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.5 KB Created: 2021-09-01 21:58:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: e76342310d735e2b487d3d2ec5d6d95c SHA-1: d9ba7d69141af5ad1198e8c3ae233a3943993615 SHA-256: cd9801e90cb00db8da3e63172fc0439028e79588b3de0ace3c59d5818e2763c2
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The heuristics reveal it functions as a link farm, with numerous embedded URIs pointing to various websites, many of which appear to be compromised WordPress installations or disposable hosting. The primary attack pattern involves luring users to these external sites, likely to deliver further payloads or conduct phishing attacks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cursosadistanciayonline.com/medios/files/21615593859.pdf
    • http://kraljicabih.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161284a9b3c4b1---2426199561.pdf
    • https://inifd.london/uploads/file/vadifosuwosipovo.pdf
    • https://www.teppiche-waschen-hamburg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c7331d9226c---80634521420.pdf
    • https://asiaviews.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qikr9ia8jpn48p6aj0qscibh83/79077421794.pdf
    • https://www.esfa.bg/root/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tuwukodujurikixu.pdf
    • http://conservationenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2fc1de2b7e---49590639561.pdf
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093fbf13decb---84258439425.pdf
    • http://gostium.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16115f021a26e7---davufit.pdf
    • http://nextgenship.net/upload/file/2021072216269740641.pdf
    • https://aldea.work/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/617aa6b3e17294ff003312f16f497d03/57451655602.pdf
    • https://alatheir.com/atheirwsfiles/file/32512252928.pdf
    • http://boschvietnam.vn/files/usersfiles/files/6688762861.pdf
    • https://claphamjunction.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dcd31f96a14c4af0c24971e1fe09c169/bizuluwaromarepesubisapo.pdf
    • https://glasschneider.koeln/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rtit5ol4vkacavntv47no343ks/80685411925.pdf
    • http://www.hollyskauaicondo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160794479561a5---zipad.pdf
    • http://emmanuelmissionarybaptist.com/clients/74938/File/jekiwomujubugotafoseguzad.pdf
    • http://caribsplash.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f747576021a---sowesajuvakavoxuduvu.pdf
    • http://studiogaleazzo.eu/userfiles/files/61569616270.pdf
    • https://lawpropertyconsultants.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cnr9f6aehg4dlj4ai95mms7jke/45524847457.pdf
    • http://cetinelektrik.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4df576c8fa---radajamilakasedarido.pdf
    • http://ytovietnam.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/27496067808.pdf
    • http://www.circoloaletrium.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aa7cddf0002---87858833837.pdf
    • http://zge-led.com/luodan/images/userfiles/file/67917980305.pdf
    • https://alfa-clining.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4372323b24bd9aff4be35808dfc1fc5b/fewakovemapodemuluvot.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=docx+to+pdf+format
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e378.bin
6aa92d05641a7d95a5d03658f46e1bc73f689030f0750494fb765df732c03e09
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE378 15988 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010cb8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10CB8 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000124cf.bin
f1e96c74c6925d20aa2f26c15126a5dda6cd0ce811eb812e01096da1470b9dfa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x124CF 10340 bytes