Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cd3ce650f757c441…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

622.4 KB
MD5: 867b6e37af8915ff37994c8b0282d5d9 SHA-1: 9ff5aab9a37c48d798ba88da195e0b1bec2b752d SHA-256: cd3ce650f757c4414a70ab9a0b34153d94740ce72884089c152415b70362c4c2
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF heuristic indicates that the document imports an external RTF file, which is then processed for OLE objects. The RTF_OBJUPDATE and RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX heuristics suggest that these embedded OLE objects are designed to be activated and contain malicious code. The presence of these indicators strongly suggests an exploit targeting Office document vulnerabilities to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Pakistan.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Pakistan.rtf) RTF contains ~2819KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Pakistan.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Pakistan.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
481c9f217056422e693f098588842f40525dcda486534e46b48a1f9492f77ad7		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 1422177 bytes
objdata_01_off002c5127.bin
cfdb4a077c5f246e92e6322395cebc5a3dcf8a28c92ec8882aadb5231c9a8a69		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C5127 584266 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.