Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cd0a44eec5f5c5e8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.65 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 3ea0b9a766c0e9629b5e54487a5e2d6e SHA-1: 19685c8621e52e399bd7740bb6c18a2be97fb330 SHA-256: cd0a44eec5f5c5e8b1edc30269f67ce39217c996fa509b721ba8fed99d78dd82
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics for Equation Editor and the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability. The ".objupdate" heuristic indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability for client-side execution. No document body text was available for analysis, but the critical heuristics strongly suggest a malicious exploit document.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00482bae.bin
4b17e8ed1c57d7fc12035534974d64425f8c8f235f3e21e798d13570e375e6fd		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x482BAE 3732 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.