Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ccf9110bd49c4ee1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

750.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-22
MD5: a41c67e0d536c8b4114bc41bbe0c1c46 SHA-1: c83a7d581623475c8459f0a4c30321d8af5b5ce2 SHA-256: ccf9110bd49c4ee1b128161cb00c14b4a7569b0cf12de7601ec309ed384fae1b
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 PowerShell T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882 indicates the file contains a malicious payload within an Equation Editor OLE object. This vulnerability is commonly exploited via spearphishing attachments to execute arbitrary code. No specific VBA or script content was found to detail further payload execution, but the exploit itself is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
6273c4817c7b76b3a7fad967461fac22d80af058dd5907e2b8aeca502e04f7b0
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01FF7C7C/Ole10Native 1467 bytes