Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cceaf1c7da1ee89d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

256.7 KB First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 11fe905eb5314931411e247d931ef78c SHA-1: e7fa831ed41281456e435301c730bcfd6fd282bc SHA-256: cceaf1c7da1ee89d1b532454025e48d4d303267d0e7843e51499d0d363731ec5
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE object data. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 via the Equation Editor, a common technique for arbitrary code execution. The presence of \objupdate further suggests an attempt to force OLE activation. This exploit is typically used to download and execute a secondary payload, hence the high confidence in this attack pattern.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000481.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x481 4140 bytes
SHA-256: 87e9bf7a204bdae1426d75cc002f0ff1f7265992be9a2854b79bf992b313b087