Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ccbfa2f27c6b194e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.3 KB Created: 2021-03-12 01:16:41 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f1ba5850fdb6419748e6a528468b8ed0 SHA-1: 9be0819bed2cbeb0e1254681a54bc1cdad7df579 SHA-256: ccbfa2f27c6b194e0f545a9d6d023b87048681d07c9e2419f992e8890bb984d2
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a URL with 'utorrent+pro+free+for+android' in the query parameters indicates a lure for potentially unwanted software. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pelibifir.ru/123?utm_term=utorrent+pro+free+for+android
    • https://xabodalemebom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381489/tufikoza.pdf
    • https://zesadokalefon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681767/6773409.pdf
    • https://bawoxuvebi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134886771/d007ef646fb0.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4407069/normal_60446f60adff3.pdf
    • https://nozudepoget.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163917/7301218.pdf
    • https://sovopedu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135301682/3784775.pdf
    • https://tilakajunobeka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739719/vagawaniwowes_vobizog_gitijazudusun.pdf
    • https://wezalowesugalu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815960/1516e.pdf
    • https://gofadoden.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134615513/doxadujuwezekasojeku.pdf
    • https://koxawikala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134643159/f40819.pdf
    • https://dadekubezaxinis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740399/tezus.pdf
    • https://mavakonagidesa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483278/mowakupovedatuvo.pdf
    • https://nobaloledajasom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681012/dumudidawuse_bebisag_kurutizejujol.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416154/normal_600f03f2a374b.pdf
    • https://gojemafofapuvog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681271/6389328.pdf
    • https://sulogaxelope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438888/d7b13cba5dd.pdf
    • https://tukobigerokigab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134653943/gogumomegerapi.pdf
    • https://xifugewelude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134353264/matoke_gumarusefi.pdf
    • https://vokugovu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134598923/2585082.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4493888/normal_5fd36ac0d3e17.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9be217f0-10c1-47d9-af33-db6f6cea8bd8/55275584787.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4d604f25-9a5f-443d-80be-d2b1da655129/seiki_32_inch_tv_wall_mount_screw_size.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b0e4644b-d2fb-4674-a11f-faf987930551/35755520381.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e1b2.bin
6b4aa4443a42a845de15f0af5ecd2a91c5e730c642e694c7cb9bc28ab8a98409		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE1B2 4816 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f226.bin
44e8148bf2219d7d74e33c373883ba5d9c1a60e6678f169c344b04841defe9f1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF226 10528 bytes

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