Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc9e9db8eb859e8d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

121.1 KB Created: 2021-06-27 08:49:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 80f2e3ad750d69b4827dba82b2a03e16 SHA-1: 6e97d420c74e271b6247f9983241dbc1b9be3004 SHA-256: cc9e9db8eb859e8d0c6f4e586d3c8c02350d431bd00327614b97263748877e22
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a link farm pointing to multiple distinct hosts, many of which appear to be compromised WordPress sites. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of an invoice lure suggests a phishing attempt to trick users into clicking the links. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the redirection or exploitation process.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9828

Heuristics 7

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://careersourceokaloosawalton.com/files/public/metezoxogizifilopelefiz.pdf
    • http://compie.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606e646f043c1---42352702511.pdf
    • http://grandrosso.com/js/upload/files/mewogopo.pdf
    • https://mosoptagro.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/beab4074e5e2ca8ff18fd3414152bed0/25290367249.pdf
    • https://nuevocoach.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/627a89b1641d3a8a6bc350eacb825fc2/toxikigorovenixagabuku.pdf
    • https://prikolnaya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a94a764ee2269e7b36e0fb03026f4c75/82559437809.pdf
    • https://joefairless.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e2dae12143f9a182d78b308aaf7b02d1/45061622022.pdf
    • https://biomedchita.ru/imeg_master/file/vijobi.pdf
    • http://www.microsinusectomi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082b652a5eac---jutunobazajupe.pdf
    • http://bestforfishing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9fa2c76e2a1d134e8e5a327210a4b170/tilemufojapuzodujar.pdf
    • https://www.capitalroofingct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b58348696dc---95567854120.pdf
    • https://alcc.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/je8pejql1o83lcdkv5rp46n8e2/tefuv.pdf
    • https://vashadvokat82.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5dd978e67349d878261d83768a7691b0/81036156190.pdf
    • https://rfcorporation.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/766e4e2525afe830a4815a582612cda5/84236527429.pdf
    • https://btsis.com/upload/ckfinder/files/76722329088.pdf
    • http://www.korayozelguvenlik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bdc872d8535---3042536637.pdf
    • https://cristalensi.com/public/File/pozidexi.pdf
    • https://www.getfitcrew.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16099be69c7b45---savajuzezorovovogenarud.pdf
    • https://aliencosmicexpo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16095d284c3349---3037351923.pdf
    • https://www.tessilgiada.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bffced66bd9---54632130863.pdf
    • http://elonsummerstorage.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c385d2f754---genowolosovupowivekewimar.pdf
    • http://wildpflanzen-planung.de/file/zedadupoworikul.pdf
    • https://nguyenvanhuongloc.vn/app/webroot/files/images/pages/files/82278577089.pdf
    • http://arcomproltd.com/userfiles/file/gegokuvumekodixu.pdf
    • https://hightechrustremovers.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b63eef7d50d---69749736022.pdf
    • http://www.victorian-manor.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a54ea47962c---99809602098.pdf
    • http://brodieaccountancy.co.uk/
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=aipb+mastering+inventory+final+exam+answers
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00017669.bin
d48291f17171e9efb67615b163ae17a1e82f10d07b608877b4868f8c2dc6a31a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17669 17552 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001a483.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A483 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001bc9a.bin
331a01e659a7ac833fd7bad71b1b66c35f055499c087a01d03def25a3ed5f841		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1BC9A 11188 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.