RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · cc9d4503dffaeece

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.81 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00

MD5: 0c1460d1ee3d35b3c93b75e0595b2aeb SHA-1: b714f986a92758f2eca0b3993b289cbcd62e0446 SHA-256: cc9d4503dffaeece35d50b239fb5237a586ba3e384e4a80c9be237aa1c7d09e2

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The critical heuristics RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 indicate exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office. The RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics suggest that an OLE object is embedded and activated, which is a common delivery mechanism for such exploits. The embedded URL, while benign on its own, is often used in conjunction with exploit documents to download further malicious content. The attack pattern is consistent with exploiting this vulnerability to achieve remote code execution.

Heuristics 6

CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759

RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off002bdbe9.bin` `ca16bbdb8e909bbf6ba58a2f06f9505793bcb1d9ec5345ffb58063d64a8a5e0d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2BDBE9	3732 bytes

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