Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc955cd4b419801f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.32 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: b4ada1cd71c2213a576f84999e200169 SHA-1: 1aa3cade5f2a5a1785479220df33714e8695b5dc SHA-256: cc955cd4b419801f0cd833470805f5e4cea9cb0ed765661d359d9df5cf7aea1d
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability related to MSXML SAX OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to achieve code execution upon opening. No specific malware family was identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploiting known vulnerabilities in document parsing to deliver a payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0033fe29.bin
a3d3716e42e2f694757cb6c103c488eaef7aab0a10d3c3a6b50edfba3bab4192
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x33FE29 3732 bytes