Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc7b7b19c3694dde…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

681.8 KB Created: 2025-10-22 14:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 701b1f527a5387937f74b813953793ec SHA-1: 8d2c2d43dc4c3912c75b7cace23bebe7e639482e SHA-256: cc7b7b19c3694ddebe911977da4482e9f733e39b2461a1defeb8bcafdd075e18
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model T1137.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The OOXML document utilizes an altChunk to import an RTF file, which in turn contains OLE objects. The RTF object is triggered for activation via \objupdate and contains excessive hex data, including a PE header. This indicates the document is designed to import and execute a malicious executable payload. The external relationship points to a template file, suggesting a potential delivery vector.

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/Round.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Round.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE
    OOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Round.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Round.rtf) RTF contains ~1798KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • External relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: file:///C:\Users\John\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Student report with photo.dotx
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Round.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Round.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af6e7.bin
eeee474604a7faff951edf359981bc6892cc501ad3ffbe0618d28d763dcf4520		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF6E7 795274 bytes
objdata_01_off0023f357.bin
24ee741dd41bc27803d80f81b66eba686fe8f5d17bd847727dc5d94834bd3188		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23F357 584826 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
008e94dd68af4600885d76f18087f8d35d4040e2308364d905db626e7fc4307c		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116840 bytes
rtf_svb_00444253.zip
a463062fa4912b21a38e780ed3e90eaa5c5b691e2da561ae5b20c5c201fb80f6		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x444253 963 bytes
rtf_svb_004456fe.zip
1db5fafdb39a4e25cd63c0d17ee124d74679ca9fa60ca30d59caa7391aab0069		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x4456FE 964 bytes
rtf_svb_0047dbcd.zip
53fff4488b7672eecc77c890505a45d3ecfc7a7654d7482c0a7d5b59e04ea302		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x47DBCD 964 bytes

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