Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc608b4a2283b8ce…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.0 KB Created: 2020-07-10 19:47:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 4b5488c4b0f270fd3a7dad94de19471e SHA-1: 8283d57bec5e6a6233f5a9a53eb9d662ffca0d93 SHA-256: cc608b4a2283b8cee2e97bbab93ef737dc4ffe3efd477ace5a04741831c56c85
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body also contains numerous URLs, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=riviera%20paradise%20tab%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.juliafeildenracing.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874458/vagejanixapipufa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.prqmale.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163858/xowategenomozep_sukokaju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lancasterjazz.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455378/bb49a0fb8f1b923.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.fittingroomligonier.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814672/sodumavasoso_sugenufefigu_tinivotosuna_sezomojodupebe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.apeironmma.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682785/vipaguxodiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.taylormccarey.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969405/vafuse_tuxezoranemumo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.biblefaithfamilychurch.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739362/5899404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jenniferwilsonwellness.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382907/penugorajibasegis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://pokonaf.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/28059654669.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xefuwen.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bipozajisadotowunuru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nuzobuko.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/13065219651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dapupinaz.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/98829264350.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/38655606666.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7618/2426/files/pinakekunuturipeli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7541/2902/files/vajuvovebukelulikopugesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/38970143778.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6497/5765/files/varopogug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007473.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7473 4784 bytes
SHA-256: 0e62bfad20d64be7afea56d3bba90e953d59b42b57ad08c6340aea88231f0e97
font_01_sfnt_off000084c4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x84C4 15636 bytes
SHA-256: 8b1b6f839f6ed192d3353c29d1923d8a7b962ae0532027fbb3bf45e9688906ec

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