Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc435f5a32936515…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.6 KB Created: 2021-09-16 01:49:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 362a1545d41070a6b057c92d3ff6f036 SHA-1: 69063c24d96feb383463dc643c93a479667e97ff SHA-256: cc435f5a3293651544660cda15c2745d8574f8c0bd95debe7ff1dc5ea56029d1
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external URLs, some of which point to compromised WordPress sites. The heuristic 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' indicates the document's intent to trick users into installing malicious software disguised as a browser update or extension. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates this by executing malicious code or redirecting the user to a malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=dark+mode+all+websites+chrome PDF link annotation
    • https://citronel.com/userfiles/files/kililuronovola.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://universal4shipping.net/userfiles/file/livogirejomepesozufof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kcss.hu/korosi/userfiles/file/xulimoranijumanubewemuju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://blpest.com/UserFiles/file/selokewefepifizagunifama.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.adler-leitishofen.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161396476d433c---3157273328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eltechma.com/zdjecia/fck/file/46790043897.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://solener.info/ckfinder/userfiles/files/86206966381.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://perksys.com/userfiles/file/jilamana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://simonide.org/userfiles/file/35969432015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rusiuojigalvoji.lt/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613c64891b7c8---patevetabilumob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bistakalikotenetwork.com/userfiles/file/94966683944.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mbeautyconcept.com/upload/content_images/file/ranitetalev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613927799d676---zorelabowalixibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gtsonline.nl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ncan3u485s6pd9mstavhtqrvf2/kuxuvefedevuwefogatekegat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mayxaydungthienlong.com/uploads/files/files/59204542754.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://etkindenetim.com/resimler/files/dajejotubufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sial.pl/galeria/file/ziwilegorifetikukolez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ivankotov.ru/img/lib/file/lavuduzurekas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.peritaonline.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/91908123194.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://charmingcurls.se/upload/file/podinored.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vivaibonomo.it/userfiles/files/foderitaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rsvforum.com/userfiles/file/80593928934.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.creativitaecomunicazione.it/js/lib/ckfinder/userfiles/files/18039494061.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vivaibonomo.it/useIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e0ef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE0EF 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f906.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF906 10852 bytes
SHA-256: 48761d100da8bd680d583a46c78b01e28dfbab0e0803bf680de9320eece27899
font_02_sfnt_off00011220.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11220 18220 bytes
SHA-256: f37f69def04481ab91ba6bd2297cdfc3b9e8cd8abb199cd99119292444d86572

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