Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc0c1dc59511f84f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.4 KB Created: 2021-02-21 06:58:36 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 2ed9386bb85d7767242b1511b721d86a SHA-1: 5157bd121563bd2f984f4fcac3e42935c8c24396 SHA-256: cc0c1dc59511f84f31199a08dbf759134464c331ff9fcc29c3bff19595ec05e8
206 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO spam tactic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to a technical manual. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware via the embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/strik?utm_term=digital+signal+processing+using+matlab+solution+manual+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://rudagaje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310377/wupuzonuwurimibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413225/normal_602ac08db665f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ruzopiter.iblogger.org/bajaj_allianz_car_insurance_renewal_copy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4453720/normal_602b50fa48585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gebevomipo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740462/1432314.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muxupodijem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885552/wivanobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bivesazi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134652180/nubapafovutik-pikomivotibixal-tasotevisoxano.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pigulanofalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406379/gorozegepemikod-xuvotazoxugop-jepomazixepuv-zadawigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gavuzolarot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134458525/mizirerovexoxow-sixonepuwe-raxipel-riwoganiviji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nabisafuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131413222/mufejepamijipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4480173/normal_5fc7e9dfbf8c3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4490370/normal_5fc7a9a0dcdf1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fawejidiribap.22web.org/30154941020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rarejiwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606055/rikidalepaw-rivezudozag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403947/normal_602d2111bc1d3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408990/normal_5fe9a8fbb1154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://xuvafinuvewabek.epizy.com/pink_minnie_mouse_bow_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e056.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE056 5612 bytes
SHA-256: 28c3ae8ef1459de268d34d6bd26d42601a7deac83e74fbc4f2c99330adaf27a5
font_01_sfnt_off0000f359.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF359 10700 bytes
SHA-256: eee7f473060615025f37a10b4cbb2b842efe89f653f8ff8c50feda95d68c657c

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